

participate in collective action:

opt out of collective harm:

Actions Sinnott-Armstrong would say are not obligatory	Actions Vance would say are wrong (or at least which violate <i>prima facie</i> duties)

1. Which does Sinnott-Armstrong seem incorrect about? Which does he seem correct about? (indicate these in the table above)
2. Which does Vance seem incorrect about? Which does he seem correct about? (indicate in the table above)
3. Are there any cases where people seem obligated to participate in collective action (rather than just opt out of collective harm)?

car push: three people are pushing a car over a cliff, with someone trapped inside. The three, together, are capable of pushing the car over the cliff with no help. Jake is incapable of stopping them. Jake does not want the person to die, but he does want some exercise. For that reason, he joins in and helps push the car over the cliff.

harmless torturers: 1,000 people are hooked up to a machine. The machine is controlled by a dial. For every turn of the dial, the people experience an imperceptibly higher amount of pain; however, after 1,000 clicks, the people would be in extreme agony. At least 1,000 people are lined up to turn the dial on the machine. Margaret knows this, and knows that a single turn will not make any noticeable difference to anyone. She does not want these people to suffer, but she enjoys turning dials, so she turns the dial one time.

Some principles

The general action principle: If it would be really bad were everyone to do x , then I have a *prima facie* moral obligation not to do x .

The indirect harm principle: If A doing x causes others to carry out acts that cause harm to, then A has a *prima facie* moral obligation to not do x .

The contractualist principle: If nobody could reasonably reject a public rule that forbids x , then there is a *prima facie* moral duty to not do x .

Vance's principle: If A foresees with near certainty that harm will result from collective action, then A has a *prima facie* obligation to opt out of the collective harm.

4. Under what conditions do we have a *prima facie* duty to opt out of collective harm and/or to participate in collective action? You can use the above principles as starting places. Your answer should fit with your answers to questions 1, 2, and 3.